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Abstract
In this paper we consider the effect of epsilon maximization on firm behavior. In 
particular we focus on the dynamic behavior of firms with the use of the example 
of price‐setting: We show how almost-rational firms can be more volatile in their 
behavior. However, if a lexicographic preference for simplicity is made, then we can 
explain nominal price rigidity as a result of epsilon optimization. The behavior of 
the firm—which is consistent with its long‐term survival—is examined. We argue 
that epsilon-optimization is consistent with survival in any context in which some-
thing is optimized: such as sales revenue.
Keywords Bounded rationality · Dynamic choice · Inertia · Price rigidity · Volatility
JEL Classification B52 · C61 · D21
The idea of bounded rationality became popular in the economics of the firm with 
the publication in Cyert and Marsh (1963) of the book A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm by Richard M. Cyert and James G. March.1 Whilst the dominant model of 
rationality has remained constrained‐optimization in most fields of economics, there 
has been a gradual spread of alternatives. Today behavioral economics is an impor-
tant component of economics across a wide range of fields.
In this paper I seek to adopt a primarily methodological approach that asks how 
we should understand near rationality in our modelling of firms.
Firms represent a range of challenges for economic theory. These can be simpli-
fied into perhaps three main categories:
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1. What are the objectives of firms (for example profits, sales, managerial utility)?2
2. As organizations, do firms seek to maximize in the pursuit of their goals, or are 
they boundedly rational in some sense (such as satisficing)? and
3. How does our conception of the behavior of the firm fit with the explanation 
for the existence or survival of firms—are firms generally efficient institutions 
in terms of minimizing transactions costs and responding to changing market 
conditions?
These issues are all linked in practice: Firms are not isolated institutions: They 
compete both in the particular markets in which they operate (for example, as oli-
gopolists that interact with each other or as incumbents that compete with potential 
entrants) and at higher levels in capital markets where firms’ overall performance 
is characterised (for example) by share prices and related profit metrics. Poorly 
managed firms cannot survive: They are driven out of business by more able com-
petitors, or perhaps they are taken over by a private equity firm for a remake and 
remodel.
We can think of these external constraints in terms of Darwinian evolutionary 
forces, as in Alchian (1950, p. 213): “This is the criterion by which the economic 
system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those 
who suffer losses disappear”. Thus, although Hick’s (1935, p. 8) thought that “the 
best monopoly profit is a quiet life”, there are limits to under‐performance that make 
even the most sedentary manager subject to scrutiny. Barnard (1938) argued that one 
of the main reasons that firms do not last forever was that over time they cease to be 
effective.
Whilst external forces operate on firms, most firms face sufficient slack to allow 
some degree of “managerial discretion”. This is particularly true for owner‐managed 
firms: So long as it remains solvent, an owner-managed firm can continue to operate. 
Indeed, some owners might even subsidise a loss‐making firm from other revenues 
for reasons beyond financial considerations.
In relation to the theory of the firm, the influential survey of Seth and Thomas 
(1994) laid out different approaches to modelling firms across the disciplines of 
economics and management. It is worth quoting at length their thoughts on fully 
rational and behavioral theories in economics (Seth and Thomas 1994, p. 175):
We note that all versions of rationality discussed above have in common that 
economic agents are viewed as purposeful and intelligent, and assumed to fol-
low reasonable and logical procedures in making decisions. Some version of 
rationality underlies all economic explanation, to allow prediction of the rel-
evant outcomes of the decision‐making process: if economic agents are per-
mitted arbitrary behavior, the outcomes of their actions are necessarily indeter-
minate. Rather, the essential difference lies in the types of decision‐rules they 
are assumed to use: maximizing, satisficing, or habit.
2 This of course depends on the key individuals and groups within the firm—for example, senior man-
agement or owners—and the interactions of these individuals within the firm.
1 3
Almost‐Maximization as a Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Static,…
We see the challenge for a behavioral theory of the firm in terms of providing 
equilibrium decision‐making processes, which are summarised as heuristic deci-
sion‐rules. The decision rules should arise from within the firm in the pursuit of its 
goals and enable the firm to survive in its competitive environment.
In Dixon (1992) I argued for the concept of near‐optimization, which is some-
times referred to epsilon‐optimization.3 Epsilon‐optimization means that the firm 
chooses an action that yields a payoff within epsilon of its optimum. The epsilon 
is assumed to be small but strictly positive, with strict optimization being the limit-
ing case where epsilon is zero. The argument is that in order for a decision rule to 
survive in the long run, it must be almost optimal. Too far away, and it will fail the 
“survival test”. Close enough, and it falls within the range of the “satisfactory, good 
enough”, and thus enables managerial discretion. This general approach leaves open 
the first issue of behavioral theory: What is almost-optimised: managerial utility, 
sales, or profits?
This paper will concentrate on these general issues with a focus on two particular 
angles: First, the interpretation of bounded rationality in dynamic Settings; second, 
how rivalry in an oligopolistic setting and the need to survive interact with the goals 
of the firm.
We apply the theory of epsilon optimization to a dynamic model and focus on 
its link to inertia or the tendency for agents to choose almost optimal strategies that 
involve holding actions constant over time. This is a very important aspect for the 
behavioral theory of the firm: In practice, we often observe firms’ setting the same 
price for prolonged periods of time.4 Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, b) put forward 
the argument that near‐rational firms would display nominal price rigidity rather 
than vary their price to track the optimum perfectly. An alternative put forward by 
Mankiw (1985) was that menu‐costs would lead to perfectly‐rational firms’ setting 
the same price for two or more periods.
To what extent is a boundedly rational firm the same as a perfectly‐rational 
firm with a menu cost? I argue that bounded rationality can lead to very different 
outcomes to the case of perfect rationality with menu costs in a dynamic setting. 
Bounded rationality does not in itself lead to inertia: There are many almost rational 
strategies in dynamic settings—only a subset of which involve choosing the same 
action over time. To obtain inertia from bounded rationality one needs to add a pref-
erence for simplicity of strategy, preferring repetition to variation.
The second issue that we examine is that of what is nearly maximized.
The long‐run survival of firms depends on earning enough profits (normal risk-
adjusted profits). Only certain forms of behavior—in terms of “decision rules”—
will be consistent with this survival criterion. Markets and firm environments differ 
in terms of: the number of active incumbents; the extent of product differentiation 
(or ability to create the differentiation through branding); the ease of entry and exit; 
3 This is often written as 휀 optimization.
4 The famous example is the 5-cent bottle of Coke that lasted over 60 years. However, the price‐quote 
data that are used to construct CPI data in many countries have revealed a long fat tail of prices that 
change very infrequently. See Klenow and Malin (2010) for a survey of the evidence.
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and so on. Short‐run profit maximization as a form of behavior may be inconsistent 
with long‐run survival, and other forms of behavior (decision rules) may emerge: 
from sales maximisation to cooperation (joint profit maximisation). These can then 
be the objectives to be almost-optimised.
The main lesson of this paper is that studying boundedly rational firms is about 
more than just looking at decision‐making processes either in the head of an individ-
ual or in the heads of a group of individuals. The processes within the firm are also 
determined by the wider environment of the firm: the market(s) it operates in, its 
interactions with competitors, and its interactions with the wider economy through 
capital markets. We will see that the “decision rules” that emerge result from the 
interaction of all three levels: the individual, the collective, and the wider economy.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Sect.  1 briefly recaps the basic theory of 
approximate optimization and its special case of perfect maximization. Section  2 
looks at almost-optimization in the context of dynamic decision making—with a 
particular focus on whether bounded rationality generates inertia in behavior. Sec-
tion 3 goes on to look at the survival of the firm in the long‐run and how this con-
strains the behavior of firms. Section 4 concludes.
1  Almost‑Optimality
Perfect rationality5 has been the approach that has been adopted by most economics 
for over a century. A stereotypical perfectly rational agent has the ability to calcu-
late the answer to any well‐defined problem. The agent has a well‐defined objective 
function that enables the best solution to be identified from a given range of possi-
bilities. An objective function should be able to rank all possible outcomes in a way 
that is transitive (or at least acyclic). Choice is subject to some constraint: for exam-
ple, a budget constraint or a technological constraint. Uncertainty can be introduced 
if there is a known probability distribution and the objective function satisfies the 
Von Neumann‐Morgenstern properties.
In its simplest form, we can think of agent utility as defined over a vector x, 
U ∶ ℜn → ℜ , where x is chosen from some compact convex set S. The agent then 
solves:
The set S may itself be determined by some parameters (prices and income in 
the case of the budget set). The solution to the problem is a choice of action x* and 
resultant utility U*; both can be seen as depending on S. In the case of the con-
sumer, the budget set is determined by prices and income: Indirect utility identifies 
the maximum utility given prices and income. The Marshallian demand is the opti-
mal choice of consumption given prices and income. The supply and input‐demand 
functions of competitive firms are likewise determined.
Max U(x) subject to x ∈ S ⊂ ℜn
5 This is often called the “neoclassical” model when applied to the firm, or hyper‐rationality in general.
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Now, let us see under what external circumstances this sort of behavior might 
arise in a firm. Perfect competition is the market structure that would lead to this 
sort of firm behavior. With free (zero cost) entry, (supernormal) profits will be zero 
in the long‐run. Firms that do not minimize costs and maximize profits will not sur-
vive against maximizers. In this textbook scenario, profit maximization is required 
for survival (except perhaps in the case of an owner manager who is willing to sub-
sidise the firm out of other income). Since profit maximization is required for sur-
vival, there is no discretion for managers; and bounded rationality is not possible 
in the long run (unless, perhaps, in the special case where it is universal across all 
firms).
1.1  Almost‑Correct Choices: Trembling Hands
We can think of almost-correct choices in terms of two metrics: the closeness of the 
payoff relative to the optimal payoff; or alternatively the closeness of the action to 
the optimal action. Under certain assumptions, these two metrics are equivalent; but 
they need not be. Consider first the case of an action: The idea here is analogous to 
the “trembling hand” of equilibrium refinements in game theory, which were first 
introduced by Selten (1975). The agent tries to implement the optimal action x* but 
by a mistake in execution chooses some other action. We might want to say that the 
mistake in action is “close” to the optimal action. That means that with an appropri-
ate metric M, the chosen action x ‘ is within a distance 휅 of x*6:
The fact that the error might be “small” when measured in the metric M need not 
imply that the loss in utility is small. For example, in an Olympic final, a small error 
can give rise to a huge difference in utility (e.g., Bronze instead of Gold). However, 
a small error in action that gives rise to a big loss can occur only if there is a discon-
tinuity in the objective function.
If we make the standard assumption that the payoff function is continuously dif-
ferentiable for at least the first two derivatives,7 then we can ensure that small mis-
takes in the implementation of the strategy will give rise to small losses in payoff. 
Put simply, if U is continuously differentiable, then for any 𝜀 > 0 , there exists 𝜅 > 0 
such that: if 𝜅 > M
(
x�, x∗
)
 , then U(x∗) − U
(
x�
)
< 𝜀
We can go further and think of this as defining the distance 휅 as an (increasing) 
function of 𝜀 ∶ 𝜅 = 𝜅(𝜀); d𝜅∕d𝜀 > 0 : If we want the loss in terms of payoff to be 
smaller than a certain level, then we need the strategy to be sufficiently close to the 
optimal strategy.8
M
(
x�, x∗
)
≤ 휅
6 For example, if x is an n-dimensional vector, a possible metric could be: M
�
x
�, x∗
�
=
∑n
i=1
���x
�
i
− x∗
i
���. 
The distance between two points is the sum of the absolute differences across each of the n dimensions.
7 This is usually written as U ∈ C2.
8 In an online appendix, we have a brief formal explanation of these ideas at http://huwdi xon.org/onewe 
bmedi a/onlin e%20app endix .pdf.
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Can we go in the other direction and claim that if the action is close in terms of 
payoff, then the action must be close to optimal? If the payoff is strictly concave, 
then the answer is yes, since there can be only one local maximum, which is the 
global maximum. If there is have weak concavity or even some convexity, then there 
can be local maxima that are close to the global maximum in terms of payoff but a 
long way away in terms of action. Think of two hills that are separated by a valley; 
hill A is slightly taller than hill B. We can be almost as high as the summit of A by 
being close to the summit of A or by being across the valley near the top of summit 
B. The valley is the convexity. If we assume strict concavity, then there is in effect 
only one hill and no local maxima other than the global maximum.
2  The Implications of Almost‑Optimization in Dynamic Models
If agents are almost-maximizing, what are the implications for how firms and mar-
kets behave over time? This has been the focus of research in the past: notably by 
Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, b) and Conlisk (Conlisk 1996).
There are two contrasting views:
• Bounded rationality increases volatility. Bounded rationality produces an addi-
tional source of noise, which can be thought of as an “erratic archer”.
• Bounded rationality increases inertia. Rather than responding to all shocks or 
changes, agents will just respond to those that take it out of its “comfort zone” or 
“Band of Inertia” as in Akerlof and Yellen.
The notion that bounded rationality might increase volatility arises from the 
following simple line of reasoning. Suppose that the optimal level of x at time t is 
driven by some random shock9 𝜀t ∶ xt ∗= x̄ + 𝜀t for example. With full rationality, 
the choice would be the optimal value: the volatility of xt would simply be the vola-
tility of the “shock” 휀t . With bounded rationality, there is another random “shock” or 
fault in execution in the form of “trembles” 휈t ∶
Assuming that the two error terms are uncorrelated, the variance of xt will be 
equal to the sum of the variances of the real shock and the trembles.
The implication that bounded rationality increases volatility rests on the idea that 
the decision-maker is trying to hit the target each period, but most of the time will 
miss it due to faulty execution. We can think of faulty execution either as being that 
the agent knows the optimal value but cannot quite hit it, or that it simply misper-
ceives the optimal value (for example, it cannot calculate the optimal value accu-
rately in real time), or indeed a mixture. An inexperienced archer knows the exact 
location of the bulls‐eye, but due to lack of skill the arrows are spread around the 
xt = x
∗
t
+ 𝜈t = x̄ + 𝜀t + 𝜈t
9 For example, we could assume that the shock is normally distributed with mean zero.
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bulls‐eye. A card player might not be able to calculate the odds accurately and so not 
know the optimal play at each stage in the card game.
The notion that bounded rationality leads to inertia rests on the idea that the 
agent is deciding whether to change its action from a previous value. The action will 
remain the same unless the agent sees a large enough advantage in changing it.
More specifically, the agent might decide to change its action only if the gains 
exceed a certain threshold. This is the notion that underlies the menu‐cost approach 
to nominal rigidity in macroeconomics. Under the standard interpretation, agents 
are fully rational but take into account the lump‐sum costs of changing price. In a 
dynamic‐stochastic continuous time set up, agents choose when to change price and 
by how much in response to evolving shocks that alter the optimal price. This sort 
of model cannot be solved analytically except for some special cases (usually the 
optimal price is Brownian motion or Wiener process, which is the continuous-time 
equivalent of a random walk).10
However, in their seminal paper, Akerlof and Yellen (1985b, pp. 823–824) put 
the argument in terms of bounded rationality:
Near‐rational behavior is nonmaximizing behavior in which the gains from 
maximizing rather than nonmaximizing are small in a well‐defined sense. It is 
Fig. 1  Epsilon optimization and 
the Band of Inertia
??????
?????
??
??
???
??????????????? ?? ?
10 To see a recent example of this approach, see Alvarez and Lippi (2014). The basic technique dates 
back to Sheshinski and Weiss (1977).
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argued that in a wide class of models ‐ those models in which objective func-
tions are differentiable with respect to agents’ own wages or prices ‐ the cost of 
inertial money wage and price behavior as opposed to maximizing behavior, is 
small when a long‐run equilibrium with full maximization has been perturbed 
by a shock. If wages and prices were initially at an optimum, the loss from fail-
ure to adjust them will be smaller, by an order of magnitude, than the shock.
In a static framework the argument is very much as in the Fig. 1 “Hill” diagram, 
which is understandable in terms of a simple one-dimensional metric where the pay-
off on the vertical axis is a concave function of price on the horizontal axis
The optimal price p∗ gets you to the top of the payoff hill, yielding payoff U∗ . 
However, any price in the “band of inertia” (size 휅(휀) ) will get you to within 휀 of the 
optimum.
2.1  Dynamic Models with no Uncertainty
In a purely static setting, models with menu costs and bounded rationality look very 
similar: One can think of 휀 as a lump sum cost with perfect optimization or origi-
nating from imperfect optimization. In a dynamic setting, matters are more compli-
cated, and we can distinguish between a menu cost and approximate optimization. 
First we need to define bounded rationality across time: Given an appropriate choice 
of metric to measure the distance between different strategies across time, bounded 
rationality would mean a choice of strategy that yields a payoff that is close to the 
optimum in terms of an appropriately discounted payoff.11 We then compare this 
bounded‐rationality outcome to the alternative perfectly‐rational outcomes with or 
without menu costs.
First we will consider a simple two period (t = 1, 2) dynamic problem with no 
discounting and no uncertainty. The payoff depends on a shift variable e (cost or 
demand) and there is a menu cost 훾 ≥ 0 to pay if the choice of x differs between the 
two periods (in this example, the menu cost can be thought of as a switching cost). 
The fully-rational firm chooses  x1 and  x2 to solve the maximization problem:
where I(x1, x2) is an index function which is zero if x1 = x2 , or one otherwise. We 
can first define the optimal flexible action for each period (the case of 훾 = 0 for all 
x1, x2 ). This is simply derived from the first order conditions given the shift variable, 
and the corresponding optimal action and payoff x ∗ and U ∗ as a function of e:
max
x1,x2
U(x1, e1) + U(x2, e2) − 훾 .I(x1, x2)
x∗ = x(e)
U∗ = U(e)
11 Of course, bounded rationality might take the form of inappropriate discounting. For example, there 
exists considerable evidence that humans have hyperbolic discounting and/or myopic planning horizons 
(see review by Frederick et al. 2002). This is a topic we do not have space to explore in this paper.
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13 Of course, bounded rationality might take the form of inappropriate discount-
ing. For example, there exists considerable evidence that humans have hyperbolic 
discounting and/or myopic planning horizons (see review by Frederick et al. 2002). 
This is a topic we do not have space to explore in this paper.
If we ignore menu costs ( 훾 = 0 ), we can define our metric in terms of a loss func-
tion, giving the lost payoff for any choice of (x1, x2) relative to the flexible optimum:
In Fig.  2 we depict the strategy space for the choice of (x1, x2) , with the opti-
mal flexible value being x∗ . We depict the set of pairs with a loss less than or equal 
to 휅 as the shaded circle. The 45-degree line identifies all combinations where the 
action is unchanged, x1 = x2 . If we are thinking of the action as setting a price, then 
the 45-degree line represents fixed prices across the two periods. Whilst we will 
interpret x as “price” in what follows, in fact it can be any “action” that determines 
payoffs.
As depicted, the 45° line intersects the shaded circle, so that there are constant or 
fixed prices that involve a small enough loss. For all of the other elements inside the 
circle, the action is different (prices change). Of course, there may be no intersection 
of the set L(x) ≤ 휅 with the 45° line: if the values of e are sufficiently different, then 
there will be no fixed price with loss less than or equal to 휅 . However, let us focus on 
cases where the 45° line intersects the shaded area.
From Fig. 2, we can see immediately that if there is a menu-cost 훾 = 휅 , then 
the optimal choice of prices across the two periods will be the subset of price 
pairs on the 45° line. This subset will earn strictly higher payoffs than all of the 
L(x1, x2) = U(x1, e1) + U(x2, e2) −
[
U∗(e1) + U
∗(e2)
]
Fig. 2  Two period choice
x*2
x*1
x*
L(x) k<
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other pairs in the circle (including the optimal flexible solution). By choosing 
from the 45° line, no menu cost is incurred: In the rest of the shaded area the 
menu cost has to be paid since prices differ in each period.
From within the set of prices which are unchanged, there will be an optimal 
price which maximizes the profits subject to the constraint that the price is fixed. 
In effect, this solves the optimization with the same x in both periods:
We can depict this is Fig. 3, zooming in on the set L(x) ≤ 휅 = 훾.
The optimum fixed-price action is where the 45° line is tangent to the iso-
payoff circle at point F*, which gives the maximum payoff from the set of fixed 
actions. This is the choice of the perfectly-rational firm with a menu cost: it will 
choose the unique optimum F*.
We can see how the optimizing firm behaves with or without menu-costs. We 
can now turn to the set of almost rational choices. The whole set L(x) ≤ 휅 repre-
sents the set of almost rational choices. Within this set, there are two possibilities:
1. The near-rational firm may choose any near-rational combination in the set 
L(x) ≤ 휅 , most of which involve choosing different actions in each period.
2. The near-rational firm may choose combinations in the set L(x) ≤ 휅 , but prefer to 
choose simple strategies in which actions are the same in each period, i.e. lying 
on the 45° line.
Maxx U(x, e1) + U(x, e2)
Fig. 3  The optimal choice with 
menu costs
x*
L(x) k<
F*
x1
x2
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In order to get outcome 2, we need not only near-rationality, but also a lexico-
graphic preference for simple strategies that involve constant actions over time. We 
can claim that from a set of strategies that are good enough, the agent will prefer a 
strategy that involves the same action in each period. This can be seen as a prefer-
ence for simplicity. We can think of an infinitesimal “menu cost” as being a small 
cost of changing prices over time. The presence of this cost causes the firm to prefer 
strategies along the 45-degree line that are a tiny bit better and will be preferred and 
chosen.
If we compare the bounded‐rationality outcomes 1 and 2 to the fully‐ rational 
menu‐cost outcome, we can see that in a dynamic setting perfect rationality and 
bounded rationality are quite different. There is no inherent reason for the boundedly 
rational firm to choose the same action in each period. The action might increase or 
decrease across time (depending on which side of the 45-degree line it is)—even 
when the optimal flexible action shows a particular pattern.
In Fig. 3, the optimal flexible action involves increasing x, since x*2 > x*1 for points 
above the 45-degree line; but there are many pairs in the shaded region below the 
45-degree line that go the opposite way  x2 < x1). It is only with option 2 combined 
with a preference for simple strategies that we will see a fixed price across the two 
periods (x2 = x1). The “band of inertia” is then equivalent to the intersection of the 
45-degree line and the shaded circle: The menu‐cost optimizer in contrast will pick 
the single point F* on that line. In terms of the hill in Fig. 1, the band of inertia is 
the 45-degree line, and point F* is value of x that gets us to the top of the hill.
2.2  Dynamic Models with Uncertainty
We will now see how uncertainty alters our analysis and concentrate on the case 
of price‐setting (although the argument applies to any variable(s) of choice). Most 
dynamic models with menu costs allow for uncertainty. It is common to assume that 
the optimal price follows a random walk12:
where et is a white noise error.13 In each period t, a new shock is realised and the 
firm updates its plans. This contrasts with the previous analysis where we assumed 
that the firms knew the value of et in both periods (effectively there was perfect 
foresight).
From (1.1) the expected value of all future errors is zero and the optimal price is 
expected to be the same in all future periods i ≥ 0:
(1.1)p∗t+1 = p∗t + et
Et
[
p∗
t+i
]
= Et
[
p∗
t
]
12 This is the discrete time version of the continuous-time model used (see, for example, Alvarez and 
Lippi 2014 or Sheshinski and Weiss, 1978). Note that in the previous section, e was a parameter that 
influenced the optimal price. In a dynamic setting, we allow e to vary over time and possibly be stochas-
tic.
13 Technically, et has an expected value of zero and is not serially correlated.
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That is, in terms of our simple two period diagram, the optimal actions lie on 
the 45° line where the optimal strategy involves planning to set the same price 
in both periods 1 and 2 ( p∗
1
= p∗
2
 ). Thus the optimal fix-price strategy and the 
optimal flex-price strategy coincide—in terms of Fig. 3; F* and x* coincide. This 
is depicted in Fig. 4: the 45° line now lies in the middle of the shaded zone and 
theoptimal strategy is on the 45° line.
Let us now assume that the firm chooses the optimal strategy in period 1. When 
period 2 arrives, the second-period shock e2 is realized, which is represented by a 
vertical shift in the optimal price equal to e2. Since the period 1 payoff is already 
a given, in period 2 the agent has the simple choice of whether to leave the price 
at its planned value or to change it to the optimal price given the realized shock. 
The problem then is exactly as we had in the one-period case: If the loss in payoff 
is sufficiently small, then the nearly‐ rational firm will not change the price.
As in the one-period case, the difference between a menu cost and bounded 
rationality is unobservable, because they look the same.
If we extend the number of periods to some finite T, we can work backwards. 
At any moment t = 1…T, the firm will expect the current optimal price to extend 
for all of the remaining periods. In the case of a fully‐rational firm without menu 
costs, the firm will plan to set its future prices equal to the current optimum 
pP
t+i
= Etp
∗
t+i
= p∗
t
 , where pP
t+i
 is the planned price in period t + i. Of course, the 
actual path of prices will follow a random walk, as the optimal price varies with 
the realization of each shock.
U(p ∗ (e2)) − U(p ∗ (0)) < 𝜅
Fig. 4  two period choice when 
the optimal price follows a 
random walk
x*
x2
x1
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With a menu‐cost, the perfectly‐rational firm will consider at any time after the 
first period, t = 2…T, whether to leave its price where it is (at the price from the 
previous period t‐1) or switch to the current optimal price. Without discounting, this 
is a simple problem: For menu cost 훾 , the firm will compare the profits it will earn 
over the remaining T − t + 1 periods from sticking with the old price (now it knows 
the current shock et), or incurring the one‐off menu cost and switching to the cur-
rent optimal price.14 Since the expected value of future shocks is zero, this takes the 
simple form:
For each period there is a band of inertia around the optimum, which becomes 
larger over time. Comparing the one‐off menu cost with the stream of losses over 
T − t +1 periods, the firm will hold constant its current price only if the current loss 
times the number of remaining periods is less than the menu cost.
At time t = 2…T, the current shock et is known and is expected to remain in 
place for the remaining T − t +1 periods. The firm can stay put and incur no menu 
cost, and then the per‐period loss is the difference between the optimal (with no 
menu costs) and what is earned at the current price. This per-period loss times the 
remaining number of periods is then compared to the one‐off menu cost. The ear-
lier that this is considered, the more likely the firm is to change: In period 2, the 
current loss is multiplied by T − 2; in the last period there is just the current loss to 
consider.
Hence there is a clear prediction: With a finite time horizon, the band of inertia 
gets larger as the firm gets closer to the final period T. Existing models of menu 
costs do not have this feature, because they assume an essentially stationary problem 
with an infinite time horizon.
It might be argued that a finite time horizon is arbitrary. However, in the case 
of price‐setting, there is clear evidence of time‐dependence in pricing: There are 
regular cycles of price‐setting that we can think of as opportunities to change 
price for free. Menu costs are incurred when the firm changes price out of the 
regular cycle. T would then be the length of the regular cycle. The probability 
of changing price would be highest near the start of the cycle, because the costs 
of getting it wrong would accumulate for a longer period of time. Near the end 
of the cycle, the firm will be changing the price soon for free, so there is less to 
worry about.
We now turn to the case of an almost-rational 휀-optimizing firm. At time t, we 
then have an almost optimal sequence of planned prices 
(
pt, pt+1… pT
)
 such that:
U(p∗
t
, et) − U(pt−1, et) <
𝛾
T − t + 1
(T − t + 1)U(p∗
t
, et) −
T−t∑
i=0
U(pt+i, et) ≤ 휀
14 The following is a slightly simplified argument, which is completely accurate only if the payoff func-
tion is quadratic so that certainty equivalence holds.
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As in the case with certainty, the almost-rational price plans may bounce around. 
We need to add a lexicographic preference from simple strategies that involve prices 
that are held fixed, which restricts our attention to plans with pt+i = pt , so that:
This is almost the same as the menu cost equation above, except that here the 
current price pt is chosen rather than the inherited pt−1 . However, invoking again 
the lexicographic preference for simplicity our firm will prefer to set pt = pt−1 rather 
than any other almost-rational price. In period 1, when the menu cost optimizer 
gets to freely choose its opening price it will set the unique optimal price p1 = p∗1 ; 
whereas the almost optimizer will have a band of choices around p∗
1
 satisfying the 
almost optimality condition:
The almost‐rational firm will have an expanding band of inertia as time moves 
towards T that is similar in type to the rational firm with menu costs. However, the 
behavior of the near‐ rational firm is less predictable. When it does change price, the 
near-optimizer does not choose the unique optimal price, but instead chooses a near‐
optimal price from the range of acceptable epsilon‐optimal prices.
There is substantial empirical evidence that the firms are less likely to change 
price as time goes on (at least initially).15 We find that a possible explanation is 
almost-rationality with a fixed time horizon: As we approach the terminal period, 
there is less to gain by changing price.
However, almost-rationality on its own will not guarantee this: We need the addi-
tional assumption that there is a preference for simple strategies: in this context: 
keeping the price unchanged. To some extent there is a degree of “observational 
equivalence” between the menu cost interpretation with perfect rationality and the 
almost-rational. However, the almost‐rational firm has a wider range of prices to 
change to when it does make the change. This result could be used to observation-
ally or experimentally differentiate between the two types of behavior.
2.3  Inertia Versus Volatility
If we contrast the Akerlof‐Yellen inertia story with the inexperienced archer, the key 
difference is that in the inertia story the choice of action is similar to a state vari-
able: It does not change from its current value without the explicit action or decision 
of the firm. The archer, however, has to shoot a different arrow each time and will 
almost never hit the same spot twice (with the exception of Robin Hood). In this 
case, there is no “simplicity” in hitting the exact same spot as was hit previously.
To be more precise: If it takes no effort to do the same as before, then we are in 
an Akerlof‐Yellen world of inertia. Where it takes just as much effort to do exactly 
(T − t + 1)
(
U(p∗
t
, et) − U(pt, et)
)
≤ 휀
(
U(p∗
1
, e1) − U(p1, e1)
)
≤
휀
T
15 In fact, this can explain the robust empirical finding of a decreasing hazard rate.
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the same as before as for any other specific action, we are in a world of considerable 
volatility due to the inexperienced archer.
If we look at the strategic choices of a firm, the important issue is whether we are 
in the world of archery or of Akerlof and Yellen inertia. If the variable in question is 
something that is clearly measurable and under precise control, then the firm can in 
principle easily choose to do exactly the same as it has done before.
Consider the price and output decisions of a farmer, for example. The farmer is 
like an archer. Both the price and output can be measured, but they are not under the 
farmer’s control. The output of the farmer is stochastic, as it depends on weather and 
other factors. Price might well be determined by the market at the time of sale. To 
get the same price (or output) at two different points in time would be almost impos-
sible to achieve.
Of course, at a more fundamental level, one can say that there is something that 
the farmer can measure and control: e.g., how many hours are worked, how many 
seedlings planted, how many animals reared, etc. At this level, the farmer is also in 
an Akerlof‐Yellen world.
However, when we look at the farm from the perspective of price and output, nei-
ther is under the farmer’s control. So, whether we classify a particular enterprise as 
belonging to the Archer/farmer set or Akerlof‐Yellen inertia set will depend on how 
we describe and specify the activities in terms of our economic model. It is not an 
absolute classification that is invariant to the purpose of economic modelling.
If we think of explaining how much activity a farmer puts into producing wheat 
and how much into raising pigs, we might be in an Akerlof‐Yellen world. The farmer 
controls the inputs into these activities, and the choice is in terms of full- or almost-
optimization—given the known distributions of supply and demand side variables 
that are beyond the farmer’s control. However, if we are looking at price and output, 
the farmer controls neither, and we are in the world of the archer.
A restaurant is more predictable than the farm. It can certainly choose its menu 
and prices, given a demand curve. However, even the restaurant does not have full 
control of output. There might be a bus strike, which would mean that some staff 
cannot get to the restaurant; staff might fall ill; the credit card connection so that 
only cash can be used. From an economic modelling perspective, we might well 
decide that the “stochastic” element in the restaurant’s production function might 
not be an important part of the story and so can be ignored.
Typically (as economists) when we model firms, we make a decision over how 
much uncertainty we build into our model, and this decision will depend on the con-
text in terms of what we are trying to model. For example, it is not usual to model 
the probability of a nuclear war that will wipe out the human race. Clearly the prob-
ability of such a war varies over time. It was zero
prior to the invention of the atomic bomb; since then it has varied, and has clearly 
been higher at times such as the Cuban Missile crisis.
Usually, economists focus on just one or two main sources of uncertainty in a 
particular model, such as a technology or cost shock on the one hand and a demand 
shock on the other. If the firms are choosing conditional on the current shock (in our 
case the e), then they are in an Akerlof‐Yellen world. If they choose prior to its reali-
zation, they are more like the archer.
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To provide a very simple modelling example: Suppose that we have a monopo-
list that sets the price with the given demand and no costs.
Now suppose the intercept term A is a random variable which can take two val-
ues, high AH and low AL , each with a probability 0.5. The firm’s profit is equal to 
revenue. The optimal flexible price P∗ is equal to
If the fully-rational firm sets price knowing the value of A, it will set the price 
each period equal to the value of Aj
2
 , with output being the same value (since the 
demand curve has a slope of unity optimal output is also Aj
2
).
For the almost-rational firm, there will be a band of inertia around each opti-
mal flex price. The maximum distance between this price and the optimum is 
s : for the high intercept the set H = 
[
P∗
H
− s,P∗
H
+ s
]
 and for the low intercept 
L =
[
P∗
L
− s,P∗
L
+ s
]
 . Since the payoff is quadratic, distance s will be the same for 
both sets. Now, if the gap between AH and AL is large enough, then H ∩ L = �
—the almost-maximizer will move between the sets H and L. This is depicted in 
Fig. 5. In this case we can think of the almost maximizing firm as the archer: it is 
trying to hit the optimal price as it switches between the two values. Whereas the 
optimiser divides its time between the two optimal prices, the almost maximizer 
will divide time between the two ranges of prices H and L.
P = max[A − x, 0]
P∗ =
Aj
2
; j = H or L
Fig. 5  Hi and Low demand with 
no common elements
AL
AH
PL
PH
H
L
Hi Demand
Low Demand
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However, suppose that the high and the low intercepts are close together so that 
H ∩ L ≠ � . In this case the almost optimal firm might adopt an entirely different 
type of behavior: setting the same price P ∈ H ∩ L for both realisations of intercepts 
A. This is depicted in Fig. 6, with the intersection of H and L being represented by 
the thick dotted line. If we add a lexicographic preference for simplicity in terms of 
price stability, prices in the intersection will be the preferred choice for the almost 
maximizer.
Now, suppose that the optimizer has to choose its price before it knows what 
value A will take. It will of course choose the price that maximize the expected 
profit:
The solution is to set the “average price”, since the payoff is quadratic and cer-
tainty equivalence applies.
If we repeatedly observe the ex-ante fully-rational price setter, since the problem 
is unchanged over time, we will see the same price set each period.
If we look at the almost‐rational firm that is in exactly the same position, we 
can see that there are a range of prices that can almost maximize profits: a distance 
plus or minus s from the optimal. The almost‐rational firm might choose to bounce 
around this set over time; or if it has a preference for simplicity, it might choose to 
stick to just one price from within a range (which of course includes the unique opti-
mum). As we saw before, there are almost‐rational sequences of prices that bounce 
E훱 = 0.5P(AL − P) + 0.5P(AH − P)
P∗ =
0.5(AL + AH)
2
Fig. 6  H and L with common 
elements
AL
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PL
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H
L
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H L
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Low Demand
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around the fully rational optimum; and there are also fixed prices that remain the 
same but close to the fully rational optimum.
We have considered a range of alternative dynamic scenarios. Whilst fully 
rational pricing usually indicates a unique path of prices (or unique conditional on 
errors), almost-rationality generates a range of possibilities: There are many paths 
of prices that are approximately rational; and at each time there will be a range of 
prices that can occur. In this case we have “extra volatility” that is potentially gen-
erated by almost-rationality. However, on the assumption that there is a desire for 
simple strategies, it is possible for prices to remain fixed for almost‐rational firms 
but not for fully rational firms.
3  Almost‑Optimising What?
Managers of firms might have very different objectives from shareholders. However, 
in an oligopolistic environment the attempt to maximize profits is not necessarily the 
best way to achieve maximum profits.
The relation between the objectives of managers and profits is a potentially com-
plex one, but we will consider it in a simple setting.
What I want to argue is that the profit motive is a long‐run force, whilst short‐run 
objectives may differ. This is hard to model in an explicit real‐time model. In terms 
of the structure we outlined in the introduction, we are moving from examining the 
decision-making process within the firm to how this is influenced by external market 
forces and the economy as a whole. We must consider how the need to survive influ-
ences the “decision rules” of the firm.
As a starting point, assume that the managerial objective is sales maximization. 
Since Vickers (1985), it has been known that in a Cournot oligopolistic setting a 
sales-maximizing firm can earn more than can a profit‐maximizing firm. If we are 
modelling a duopoly, the individual firm’s reaction function will depend on the 
objective (sales, profits, etc.). In a Cournot setting, sales maximization will lead the 
firm to choose a larger output than does a profit-maximising firm. This can lead to 
the reaction function of the sales-maximiser to shift out and move the Nash equilib-
rium towards the Stackelberg point, which increases the profits that are earned by 
the sales‐maximizer over the profits that are earned by the profit‐maximizer.
Thus we can see that it is possible for the non‐profit-maximizer actually to earn 
higher profits than does the profit-maximizer. Hence the capital market or stock‐mar-
ket requirement for survival will be satisfied by the sales-maximizer, and indeed an 
evolutionary process could drive out profit-maximizers in this market environment.
There has been much research on the subject of delegation and the relationship 
between managers’ objectives and the profitability of firms, as is surveyed (for 
example) in Sengul et al. (2012). There are many possible outcomes, and crucially 
the nature of the game played by the duopolists matters. If the two firms are playing 
a game where their choice of actions are strategic substitutes (as in Cournot oligop-
oly), more aggressive behavior—such as sales maximization—can increase profit. 
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Whereas, if their choice variables are strategic complements—as in a standard Ber-
trand framework—the opposite will be true.16
Another example is the evolution of cooperation with satisficing firms, which is 
explored in Dixon (2000). We can now introduce the capital market as an explicit 
force and require that firms earn at least normal profits, which is defined to be aver-
age firm profit across the whole economy.
Consider a simple prisoner’s dilemma type situation, where both firms earn 2 
when they cooperate; if they both compete (defect), they earn 1. If one defects whilst 
the other cooperates, it earns 3 and the other earns 0.
Now, suppose that we think of firms that are playing this game across the whole 
economy in pairs, locked into their local industry. The capital market is present in 
the sense that the firms are required (at least in the long run) to earn normal prof-
its. As in satisficing models, I assume that if the firm earns at least average profits 
it continues to pursue its current strategy. If it is not earning normal profits, it will 
switch to some other strategy.17
In this simple example of two possible actions (cooperate, defect), a firm with 
below-average returns will switch to the other strategy with a high probability and 
stick with its current strategy with a low probability.
In Dixon (2000) I show that in this set up, collusion will come to predominate in 
each industry (Theorem 1). The reasoning behind this result is simple: In the pris-
oner’s dilemma example, there are three possible states: both firms cooperate and 
earn 2; both firms defect and earn 1; and two mixed states where one firm defects 
and the other cooperates and on average the two firms earn 1.5. The average payoff 
in the economy will then be the weighted average of these three payoffs; the weights 
are the proportion of industries in each state. Average profits in the economy will 
thus range from 2 to 1. Cooperation becomes an absorbing state: If a firm is in an 
industry where both firms are cooperating, the firm’s payoff will be above average if 
some proportion of industries are in the defect or the mixed state.
Now, if we look at the industries in the mixed state, one firm is doing very well 
(3 will necessarily be above average), and one will be doing very badly and earning 
below average profits. The firm that is doing badly will have to change its strategy 
from cooperate to defect. Hence, industries that are in a mixed state will transition 
to the defect state. Given that there is a measurable proportion of industries in the 
cooperation state, then the average payoff must exceed 1. Hence, for industries in the 
defect state both firms will be earning below-average profits. This will cause both 
firms to switch strategy and with some non‐zero probability will move to the coop-
erative state. Thus, in the long‐run, all industries become cooperative.
The evolution to cooperation has relied on firms’ remaining fixed together in the 
same industry and competing over time. However, as Bendor et al. (2001) showed, 
even with random matching—firms’ being randomly paired each period—the result 
of evolving cooperation can still come about (although it is not so inevitable).
17 Technically, it is assumed that the firm randomly switches and all strategies have a non‐zero probabil-
ity of being chosen.
16 For a full discussion, see Dixon (2001, ch. 6).
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The important point here is that cooperation is a dominated strategy, and firms 
have pressure coming from capital markets that forces firms to choose the coop-
erative strategy. The prisoner’s dilemma is a simple two-choice example. However, 
even in more complicated settings there will be a tendency toward collusion (for 
example, Cournot duopoly with a large but finite number of output choices).
The cooperative output or strategy might be a long way from the optimal—not 
even being “almost” optimal—if we interpret optimal as profit- or payoff-maximiz-
ing. Is there any way of thinking of this sort of behavior as near-rational or rational 
in a different sense?
The idea that cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma can be thought of as 
almost-rational goes back at least to Radner (1980). His paper analyses behavior in a 
repeated game with common knowledge, which is a different setting from those con-
sidered previously. He showed that with a finitely repeated game, cooperation could 
be a subgame perfect epsilon‐ equilibria at the beginning of the game up to a point 
somewhere near the final stage of the game. We can think of the simple decision 
rules such as tit‐for‐tat (or indeed tit for two tats) as being approximately rational—
at least in the early stages.
We can conclude this section by saying that when firms are concerned with sur-
vival in an environment where they are interacting with other firms, they may end up 
using decision rules that are different from profit-maximization. From the perspec-
tive of near rationality, if we can characterise the optimal decision rule as optimising 
something (sales, joint‐profits etc.), then we can also think of the epsilon-maximiza-
tion of this objective.
However, will evolutionary forces of the market drive out epsilon-maximization 
or drive epsilon to zero? I would argue no. The epsilon is envisaged as a small num-
ber or proportion. As we argued in the introduction, a firm with a large epsilon (an 
error-prone firm) would indeed fail. However, I would argue that the market itself 
has some grit or “epsilon” that will allow long‐run (risk-adjusted) profits to vary 
among firms. Small differences in profits will pass by largely unnoticed and not lead 
to any response. That is the essence of the managerial discretion idea and Hick’s 
quiet life in miniature.
There are, I believe, counteracting tendencies in the interaction of firms within 
their own markets and the economy as a whole. As competitors within an industry, 
firms want to outdo their rivals, and this tends to make them more competitive (as in 
the sales-maximiser example). However, the capital markets want industries that are 
less competitive. The balancing of these local and global forces is a subject worthy 
of future research.
4  Conclusion
In a simple static framework, epsilon-optimization or near-rationality is easy to 
understand. The agent reasons or reaches its decision by some process that gets 
close to the maximum—as in the Fig. 1 “Hill diagram”. In this paper, I have sought 
to examine what epsilon-optimization means in a dynamic setting where a firm is 
deciding what to do over time and under changing conditions. Near-rationality can 
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give rise to erratic behavior, as is described by the Archer metaphor: The choices 
can be more variable than the optimal.
However, we can also see the emergence of inertia or keeping to the same strat-
egy over time—particularly if we assume that the firm has a lexicographic prefer-
ence for simplicity and prefers the almost‐rational strategies that involve holding its 
action constant. This is similar to the menu‐cost model of the rational-optimiser that 
is subject to lump‐sum menu costs; but as I showed it differs since there is no “menu 
cost”. In addition, whilst the menu‐cost optimum might be unique, the near‐rational 
outcomes are never unique.
When we turn to the survival of the firm over time, near-rationality is only nearly 
as good as its fully‐rational counterpart. If we can say that long‐run survival depends 
on maximizing some objective, then we can also say that long‐run survival may be 
consistent with near-maximization of the same objective.
However, the decision rules that are consistent with long‐run survival depend on 
the strategic environment in which the firm finds itself and may have no obvious 
interpretation. The behavior of firms may be consistent and rule-following; but the 
rule cannot be understood as resulting from maximizing the firm’s objectives except 
in the context of the interaction of the firm with the wider market and economy as a 
whole.
In that context the behavior of the firm can be understood only by explaining how 
the decision rule arises—not as the solution (exact or approximate) to an optimiza-
tion problem.
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